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This contribution investigates severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany. 
Particularly, it responds to the following questions: Who receives severance payments? By 
which characteristics is the level of severance payments determined? Is overcompensation to 
be considered a relevant issue? Hereby, individual and collective dismissals are distinguished. 
This is the first study on this issue using individual representative data – the German Socio-
Economic Panel – and multivariate methods. The results indicate that rather women, persons 
with many years of tenure and working in big firms receive severance payments. There is a 
huge variance in the size of the payments, which can only partly be explained by tenure, the 
wage and citizenship. About one quarter of dismissed employees is better off in their 
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This contribution investigates severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany. 
Particularly, the following questions are addressed: Who receives severance payments? By 
which characteristics is the level of severance payments determined? Is overcompensation to 
be considered a relevant issue? Hereby, individual and collective dismissals are distinguished. 
This is the first study on this issue using individual representative data – the German Socio-
Economic Panel – and multivariate methods. The results indicate that rather women, persons 
with many years of tenure and working in big firms receive severance payments. There is a 
huge variance in the size of the payments, which can only partly be explained by tenure, the 
wage and citizenship. About one quarter of dismissed employees is better off in their 
following careers independent of having received a severance payment.  
 
Key words  Severance Payments; Dismissals; Plant closings, Dismissal Protection  
JEL Classification Codes  M51, M52, J65, J32, J53 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2000 the British Vodafone Group acquired the German Mannesmann AG, what resulted in 
a redundancy of Mannesmann CEO Klaus Esser, inter alia. However, the financial 
consequences for Klaus Esser were not too bad: he received a totalling severance payment of 
over  € 30,000,000. This ‘golden parachute’ was approved by the board of directors and 
justified with Esser’s success in increasing the shareholder value of the Mannesmann AG (see 
Financial Times Deutschland 2000). 
 
Obviously, there are other rules to define whether ordinary employees other than top 
managers receive severance payments in the case of dismissals and how to fix their size. 
Apart from the above mentioned prominent case, astonishingly little is known about 
severance payments for individually or collectively dismissed employees in Germany. The 
legal framework is not very explicit with respect to this issue and there are only few and not 
very updated studies, which concentrate on decisions of labour courts and severance 
payments in connection with social plans in firms with mass layoffs (see Falke et al. 1981, 
Falke 1983, Hemmer 1997a).    2
 
The aim of this study is therefore to analyse the relevance of severance payments in Germany. 
Both, the probability and the size of severance payments are examined. We make use of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a large representative data set, which has not been 
consulted for this issue before. 
 
This contribution does not focus on the effects of severance payments. See instead Burda 
(1992) for a theoretical analysis or Lazear (1990), Addison and Grosso (1996), Addison et al. 
(2000) and Hunt (2000) for empirical investigations of the effects on labour market outcomes. 
Kodrzycki (1998) and Pencavel (2001) examine the effect of severance pay on individual 
behaviour empirically. 
 
Some contributions have already investigated the size of severance payments to dismissed 
employees on an aggregated level. Within a wider context, several contributions analyse 
adjustment costs – differentiated in hiring and firing costs. The results vary substantially 
among countries and industries (see e.g. Burda 1991). For instance, Del Boca and Rota (1998) 
estimate hiring costs of 2.0 to 2.6 months of labour costs and a huge range from 0.5 to 20 
months of labour costs for firing costs in Italy. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996: 1280) and Hunt 
(2000: 181) provide brief overviews of the relevant literature. The few studies dealing with 
the size of individual severance payments in Germany are discussed in Section 2 below. 
 
There are different theoretical economic approaches dealing with severance payments, which 
are associated with this empirical study to some extent.
1 Fabel (2002) analyses the effect of 
severance payments on the layoff decisions of firms and finds decreasing layoff rates for older 
employees if severance payments increase with seniority. Suedekum and Ruehmann (2003) 
focus on the effect of severance payments on the human capital accumulation of employed 
workers. In general, investments in firm-specific human capital are strengthened by severance 
payments. However, the penalty function of dismissals is weakened simultaneously. Goerke 
                                                 
1 The general seminal work dates back to Oi (1962), who characterised labour as a quasi-fixed factor and 
examines – among other things – a rational order of dismissals at redundancies.   3
(2003) incorporates this point even more explicitly within an efficiency wage model assuming 
that severance payments in the case of collective dismissals are also given to shirkers. 
Galdon-Sanchez and Güell (2003) point out a double moral hazard problem in dismissal 
conflicts within an efficiency wage framework. If firing costs are higher in the case of 
redundancies compared to disciplinary dismissals, employers will always have an incentive to 
claim each dismissal as a disciplinary one. On the other hand, workers have always an 
incentive to claim unfair dismissal in order to receive a (higher) severance payment. If 
information problems occur for a court, wrong decisions lead to the situation that some 
redundant employees do not receive severance payments and some other fairly dismissed 
employees by disciplinary reasons do receive severance payments. 
 
Other authors provide bargaining models, where employees and employers ex ante bargain 
about wages and the amount of severance payments. Hence, the determination of the size of 
severance payments is in the spotlight of these contributions. For example, Booth (1995) und 
Pita (1997) obtain a full insurance of the employees as a result. In this sense, full insurance 
means constant marginal utility of the employees over the states. Fabel (1996) even finds 
cases of efficient overcompensation of employees within his ex ante bargaining model with 
labour cost minimising firms. 
 
Malo (2000: 270f) points out that there is considerable empirical evidence of ex-post 
bargaining about severance payments in most European countries as well. In this sense “ex 
post” means that negotiations about severance payments begin subsequent to the perception of 
a negative shock. He provides a model, which fitted especially the Spanish institutional 
framework of individual dismissals. However, the German case is represented by ex-post 
bargaining very often as well, because unions are responsible for wage bargaining industry 
wide and works councils rather than unions can help employees to receive substantial 
severance payments, when dismissals occur. In another paper Malo presents an ex-post 
(Nash-) bargaining model representing collective dismissals in continental Europe (see Malo 
2001). One of the important results is again an overcompensation of the dismissed employees. 
Malo (2001: 84-86) and Fabel (1996: 592) try to find some evidence of overcompensation   4
that is in line with these theoretical considerations. Fabel argues on the basis of average 
severance payments in Germany and Malo gives a numerical example, using aggregated 
averages of severance payments and wages in Spain. A first direct empirical examination, 
using individual data – missing so far –, is given in this contribution (subsection 3.4).  
 
At least the ex-ante bargaining models implicitly presume an insurance function of severance 
payments. Severance payments are supposed to act as insurance benefits against uncertain 
employment conditions. In this sense, severance payments can be characterised as breach 
penalties firms have to pay for breaking employment relationships (see Pita 1997). Hence, the 
size of the severance payments has to be bargained ex ante. Another possible function of 
severance payments is the welfare function. In this case, the underlying objective is the 
reduction of financial disadvantages caused by the dismissal. It is therefore clearly future 
based and ex post negotiations between employers and employees are necessary.
2 In the sense 
of such a welfare function, severance payments can only be pushed through by legal 
requirements or with employers having a sense of social responsibility. The latter possibility 
is usually neglected in economic models. Relevance of this welfare function might result in 
higher severance pay probabilities and sizes for persons faced by unemployment subsequent 
to their dismissals and individuals with children under age or other obligations to pay 
maintenance. The empirical relevance of the welfare function will be explicitly examined in 
this study. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the legal framework with respect to 
severance payments in Germany. Additionally, the results of earlier studies are summarised. 
Section 3 comprises the empirical study on severance payments for dismissed employees 
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel. We will respond in detail to the issues, who the 
beneficiaries of severance payments are, which characteristics determine their levels, and 
whether overcompensation is important. Individual and collective dismissals are kept separate 
throughout the study. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
2 See Hemmer (1997a: 27-30) for a summary of different possible functions of severance payments.   5
2. Severance pay in Germany – legal framework and prior evidence 
 
As mentioned above, German law neither lays down general severance payments in the case 
of individual dismissals nor minimum severance payments in the event of collective 
dismissals in Germany as opposed to other European countries like France, Spain or the UK.
3 
Obviously, an empirical examination of the receipt and size of severance payments is 
particularly interesting for countries without explicit laws, which strictly define recipients and 
size of severance pay. In spite of the absence of mandatory regulations, severance payments 
in connection with dismissals can be observed in Germany as well. Different types of 
severance payments can be distinguished (see e.g. Inhoffen and Müller-Dahl 1981). The first 
type is based on the Protection Against Dismissal Act (“Kündigungsschutzgesetz”). Until 
December 2003 it was applicable for firms with more than five employees and employees 
with more than six month of tenure.
4 Severance payments can be the outcome of dismissal 
protection claims if ordinary dismissals are socially unjustified or extraordinary dismissals are 
causeless.
5 In these cases severance payments are arranged if one party makes the application 
to cancel the employment relationship (although the dismissal was socially not justified), 
because a further co-operation between the employer and the employee cannot be expected.  
 
A court decision is not necessary for a severance payment. Frequently the parties come to an 
agreement with the help of a court without an official decision and in many cases employees 
and employers agree upon a certain amount of severance pay without using a court at all. 
They may anticipate the costs and the uncertain outcome of claims and are both better off – in 
terms of expected utility – with a mutual agreement. Additionally, many firms worry about a 
                                                 
3 See Küchle (1990),the OECD (1999) and Bertola et al. (1999) for an international comparison of legal 
frameworks. See Eger (2002) for a more detailed description of the legal framework for dismissals in Germany 
compared to the USA. 
4 In December 2003 dismissal protection has been lowered for firms up to 10 employees. Since the empirical 
study of this contribution covers the years 1991 to 2002, it is not faced by this reform. However, from October 
1996 to January 1999 the threshold of 10 employees did also exist. 
5 An ordinary dismissal has to be justified with a misconduct of the employee (e.g. repeated late arrivals), lack of 
capability (e.g. repeated or long term illness) or redundancies of the firm (§1 Protection Against Dismissal Act). 
An additional requirement for a socially justifiable dismissal is that there is no possibility to employ the worker 
on a different position or plant in the firm. Misconduct of the employees is the reason for the majority of cases 
(see Falke 1983: 19). See Kittner and Kohler (2000) for a detailed description and discussion of the German 
legal position in comparison to the USA. Additionally, Emerson (1988: 808-811) and the OECD (1999) provide 
a summary of international legal frameworks regarding individual and collective dismissals.   6
loss of reputation if conflicts concerning dismissals become public knowledge.
6 Actually, the 
share of dismissal protection claims with respect to all dismissals was only about eight 
percent at the beginning of the 1980s (see Falke 1983: 27).
7 This value increased up to 27 
percent in 2001, when German labour courts decided on more than 250,000 dismissal 
protection claims. Thereby, 4 of 5 court decision are in favour of the employee (see Jahn and 
Schnabel 2003). 
 
A different, second type of severance payment can occur in the context of operational changes 
in connection with mass dismissals and a social plan.
8 The German Works Constitution Act 
(“Betriebsverfassungsgesetz”, §§ 112-113) defines that a social plan, as a result of the 
coordination of the interests of the management and the works council, shall allay the 
economic disadvantages of the dismissed employees, in particular earnings decreases. The 
German Work Constitution Act aims at firms with at least five employees. A social plan can 
be conducted with a minimum number of six dismissed employees.
9 Obviously, the function 
of a social plan for the firms is somewhat different. From the firms’ point of view personnel 
costs are supposed to be reduced with the help of dismissals and dismissal protection, as well 
as the necessity of social plans, acts as a restriction of the firms’ decision-making authority. 
Severance payments from dismissal protection claims or settlements can be credited against 
payments from social plans. Both types of severance payments are paid as a lump sum and 
not on a weekly or monthly basis for example. The entitlement to possible unemployment 
benefits is not affected by the severance pay in general. 
 
The size of severance payments is not clearly determined by law, either. The Protection 
Against Dismissal Act denominates only maximum limits at the amount of 12 monthly wages 
in general and 15 or rather 18 monthly wages for older employees with many years of tenure. 
                                                 
6 That is why an increasing number of firms authorise some kind of “dismissal consults”, who teach managers 
how to dismiss employees in order to avoid conflicts when dismissals become necessary (see Schrep 2003). 
7 This fraction was somewhat higher, if the dismissals were justified with the behaviour or the person (0.1) than 
in cases in which the dismissals were justified with operational reasons (0.04).  
8 Heseler and Mückenberger (1999) provide a comprehensive overview of the management of redundancies in 
Germany. 
9 In detail, a social plan has to be conducted if 20 percent of the workforce or at least six employees are faced 
(firms with less than 60 employees), 20 percent or at least 37 affected employees (firms with less than 250 
employees), 15 percent or at least 60 affected employees (firms with less than 500 employees) and 10 percent or 
at least 60 affected employees in firms with at least 500 employees.   7
But there is scope of discretion of the courts, which is endorsed by juridical commentaries on 
the law, in order to establish an “equitable” severance payment in every single case (see 
Ascheid et al. 2000: 631ff.). Hence, the size of severance payments should also be determined 
by future prospects next to past employment characteristics. Apart from court decisions, it is 
possible that employers and employees make a settlement, which can be coordinated with the 
help of a judge, though. In this case, an empirical formula, such as a severance payment to an 
amount of half a monthly wage per year of tenure, is argued to be well established. 
Characteristics next to tenure and the previous wage that can play a role in court decisions 
encompass the age
10, the amount of social adverseness, the economic situation of the firm, the 
expected or actual unemployment duration of the dismissed employees and maintenance 
obligations (see Dorndorf at al. 2001: 602-604). 
 
The size of severance payments in the case of collective dismissals using social plans is not 
fixed either. Some kind of „severance pay formula“ is usually used to calculate the individual 
payments for the affected employees. Frequently these payments are increasing with tenure, 
previous wage and age. But other individual characteristics may be relevant as well. 
Additionally, the jurisprudence indicates that big companies have to pay more on average 
because of higher financial opportunities (Inhoffen and Müller-Dahl 1981: 1474). 
 
Only little is known about the size of individual severance payments in Germany up to now. 
On the basis of a firm sample Falke et al. (1981) find severance payments of DM 7,149 (€ 
3,655) on average. But the amounts are very unevenly distributed with few very high 
payments. The median is about DM 2,700 (€ 1,380) in this early study. Data of labour courts 
decisions in Germany at the end of the seventies show that severance payments are arranged 
at DM 2,000 (€ 1,023) on average (median) at first instance (see Falke 1983). By dividing the 
severance payments by monthly wages (in DM) and tenure (in years) it is possible to calculate 
severance pay factors, which are slightly above 0.5 on average. This means that the labour 
courts adjudge half a monthly wage per year of tenure to dismissed workers.  
                                                 
10 Usually, the amount of severance payments should increase with age. But it can also decrease for older 
employees, who attain mandatory retirement (65 years) in the nearer future.   8
 
In a more recent study, Hemmer (1997a) examines the level of severance payments in the 
context of social plans. The data contain over 100 firms, which are faced with a social plan. 
The financial burden of the firms with social plans account for 4% of personnel expenses or 
1.3% of total revenue in 1995. The mean severance payment per worker within the social 
plans of his sample increased from DM 13,360 (€ 6,830) in 1985 to DM 19,900 (€ 10,175) in 
1995 (see Hemmer 1997a: 113). Hemmer considers possible individual determinants like 
wages and tenure for the size of severance payments. Unfortunately, he is not able to analyse 
these features due to lack of data. The relevance of the different possible functions of 
severance payments has not been examined until now, neither. Remember that higher 
(probabilities of) severance payments are expected for persons with maintenance obligations 
and those faced by unemployment subsequent to their dismissal, if a welfare function of 
severance payments is empirically relevant. 
 
3.  Empirical Study 
 
As it is shown in the previous section, only court decisions and the outcomes of social plans 
have been analysed in very few studies so far and additionally most of the data are somewhat 
outdated. Court decisions only account for a small fraction of dismissal protection claims (see 
Kittner and Kohler 2000: 27). Up to 90 percent of the cases end up with a mutual agreement 
between the employer and the employee without a court decision. Hence, most of the relevant 
cases of severance payments have not been analysed before. The study presented in this 
section will use an individual German data set and integrate all kind of severance payments. 
 
There are hardly any comparable international studies either. To our knowledge, only one 
study analysed determinants of received severance payments and the amount of severance pay 
with individual data and multivariate methods so far. Kodrzycki (1998) matches a 
Massachusetts displaced workers data set with information on severance benefit plans of 15 
employers with mass layoffs, which result in some 2,000 observations. She investigates that 
the probability of receiving a severance payment after a dismissal increases with job tenure,   9
tends to increase with age and is higher in firms of the manufacturing sector. The size of 
severance pay – measured in the number of weekly wages
11 – also increased with tenure as 
well as with former annual earnings, and is below average in the manufacturing sector (see 
Kodrzycki 1998: 67). The shortcoming of this study is obviously that the data are not 





This study is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a yearly 
representative sample survey of people living in Germany.
12 The sample of this study is 
restricted to persons, who were affected by an individual or collective dismissal (including 
plant closings) within the observation period 1991 to 2002. Information for the reason of a 
separation is only given in the GSOEP from 1991 on. The sample includes only individuals, 
who were full-time employees before the dismissal (blue and white collars). Thus, building 
the data set requires matching information of the individuals of two subsequent years. We 
have information about the severance payments and the employment status of the present 
years in addition to the information of the individuals’ jobs in the previous year. It yields a 
sample size of 2,534 dismissed employees. In the years 1991 to 1998 and 2001 to 2002 the 
questionnaire of the GSOEP distinguishes between individual and collective dismissals. 
Hence, the observations of the years 1999 and 2000 are missing in each separated analysis, 
which lead to 1,452 persons faced by individual dismissals and 769 by collective dismissals in 
the data set. The fraction of the latter group decreases from 40 to 30 % during the observation 
period. A severance payment is received by 27 percent of all individuals in the sample, 
whereby this fraction is somewhat higher for collectively dismissed employees (0.33) than 
individually dismissed employees (0.26) (see Table 1 and 2). Hence, more than two of three 
                                                 
11 The form of severance payments varies among employers in Massachusetts. Some are disbursed weekly and 
others as a lump sum (see Kodrzycki 1998: 44). Hence, the system differs slightly from severance payments in 
Germany, where generally a lump sum is paid. 
12 The data is available from the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.    10




This study has got the following objectives: First, the receipt of severance payments is 
examined. In a second step we analyse the subgroup of employees who received severance 
payments and ask for the determinants of their size. An integral part is the analysis of the 
relevance of a welfare function of severance payments. Additionally, we have a closer look on 
the variance of the payments and on the relevance of overcompensation. 
 
In order to investigate these issues, we make use of several other variables of the GSOEP as 
well. At first, there are individual characteristics as sex, age, years of schooling, employment 
status, citizenship, tenure, marital status and children in the household, for example. 
Secondly, job based characteristics such as firm size and branch of industry are taken into 
account as well. 
 
There are only insignificant differences in the descriptive statistics of the persons faced by 
individual and collective dismissals with respect to most of the variables (see Table 1). Two 
thirds in the sample are male; nearly half of them have at least one child under age in the 
household and about 0.6 are blue collar workers. More than 80% are German, and half of 
them are from East Germany. Considerable differences can be pointed out as to observed 
unemployment spells subsequent to the dismissal and for years of tenure. Individually 
dismissed employees are more likely to be faced by unemployment (0.57 as compared to 0.4 
for collective dismissals).
14 Tenure is much higher for collectively dismissed persons (10 
years compared to 6 years), even though the difference as to the average age is less than two 
years.  
                                                 
13 However it is important to take into account that the sample include 10 percent of observations with tenure not 
greater than half a year. These are employees, who are dismissed during their probation period and are not 
covered by the Protection Against Dismissal Act. Excluding these observations has no qualitative effect on the 
following results.  
14 This difference is highly significant based on a T-Test. Hence, it supports the “lemon-story” of Gibbons and 
Katz (1991). They derive theoretically and find empirical support for the hypothesis that individually dismissed 
employees have lower productivity and have therefore worse future labour market outcomes in terms of 
unemployment spells and wages.  Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual and collective dismissals  
  WHOLE SAMPLE  INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS  COLLECTIVE DISMISSALS 













































Severance  Payment 0.272 1  0 0.261 1  0  0.329  1  0 
Sex  (male)  0.673 0.617 0.694 0.674 0.588  0.704  0.651  0.628  0.663 
Age  (years)  39.48 42.19 38.46 38.90 41.92  37.84  40.77  42.34  39.99 
Years  of  schooling  11.41 11.57 11.35 11.31 11.58  11.21  11.67  11.57  11.72 
Marital status (single)  0.258  0.155 0.297 0.280 0.177  0.316  0.203  0.119  0.244 
Child  in  household  0.422 0.415 0.425 0.419 0.422  0.418  0.446  0.431  0.453 
Unemployed    0.521 0.496 0.530 0.565 0.562  0.566  0.402  0.387  0.409 
Blue  collar  worker  0.616 0.557 0.638 0.624 0.528  0.658  0.572  0.593  0.562 
Tenure  (years)  7.30 12.16 5.49  6.19 11.12  4.46  9.94  13.98  7.96 
Firm size: 
1 - 5 employees 
6 - 19 employees 
20 - 199 employees 
























































Region  (West  Germany)  0.519 0.507 0.523 0.521 0.517  0.522  0.503  0.478  0.516 
Citizenship  (German)  0.836 0.830 0.838 0.820 0.815  0.822  0.850  0.846  0.853   12
 
3.2 Who receives severance payments? 
 
As mentioned above, there are no mandatory severance payments in connection with 
dismissals in Germany and within this sample less than one third of the dismissed employees 
receive a severance payment. Hence, the question arises, whether there are any individual or 
job based determinants for the receipt of severance payments. A first possibility to analyse 
this issue is to look at the descriptive statistics of possible determinants, separated for persons 
with and without severance payments (see Table 1). Additionally, Table 2 presents the 
percentages of persons with severance payments in the corresponding subgroups of the 
sample.  
 
Several variables are inspected for both, the answer of the questions who gets severance 
payments and which characteristics determine the size of severance payments (subsection 
4.3). Tenure, age and the previous wage are mentioned in the Protection Against Dismissal 
Act and are well known factors of social plan practise as well. Hence, we can expect a 
positive correlation between these variables and severance payments. Additionally, firm size 
is obviously important, since the Protection Against Dismissal Act and the Works 
Constitution Act are not valid for very small firms. Apart from that, the economic situation of 
the firms regularly influences court decisions (see Dorndorf et al. 2001: 603), which may 
enlarge severance payments for huge firms, if they have better financial opportunities. If firms 
account for the individual situation of the dismissed employees, underage children in the 
household and an actual unemployment status following the dismissal should enlarge the 
probability and the size of severance payments. Significant effects of these variables would 
confirm the relevance of a welfare function of severance payments as discussed above. There 
might be also differences between sex, citizenship and occupational status due to some kind 
of statistical discrimination. If groups of employees differ in the information degree 
concerning dismissal protection – and therefore in the probability to file a suit –, firms can try 
to dismiss the uniformed groups (e.g. foreign employees) without (or with lower) severance   13
payments. Last but not least, regional and industry distinctions as well as the year of the 
dismissal are taken into account. 
 
The univariate results indicate that a receipt of severance payments is less likely for males, 
younger employees, singles, employees with less schooling and tenure, blue collars and 
employees working in small firms. There are significant differences in the means of these 
variables between the persons with and without severance payments.
15 The most noticeable 
differences occur especially as to the firm size. Only 6 percent of dismissed workers in firms 
with not more than five employees, but nearly half in larger firms with more than 200 
employees get severance payments. Additionally, differences between the corresponding 
percentages of men (0.25) and women (0.32) as well as of singles (0.16) and other marital 
status (0.31) are remarkably high as well (see Table 2). Table 1 also shows a considerable 
influence of tenure. The average tenure of persons with severance payment (12.2 years) 
comes up to more than twice the amount of persons without severance payments (5.5 years). 
No significant differences can be found as to the citizenship, the region of the workplace, the 
unemployment status subsequent to the dismissal and the fact that there are children in the 
household of the dismissed persons. The results for individual compared to collective 
dismissals are similar, but not identical. The most striking result for both groups is that the 
probability of severance payments increases with the firm size. However, the results for sex 
and blue collars not differ significantly for collective dismissals.  
 
Additionally, there might be industry effects that explain differences in receiving severance 
payments. Table 3 shows that dismissals are more common in the sectors farming, 
manufacturing and construction. The share of persons in these industries within the sample is 
much higher than within the whole German workforce. In contrary, dismissals are not so 
widespread in the service industries. The fraction of persons with severance payments differs 
considerably between the industries as well. Especially people who are employed in the 
manufacturing industry have high probabilities of severance payments in the case of 
dismissals (0.39). Opposed to that, the fraction is very low for the sectors 
farming/forestry/fishery and construction (0.15 each). 
 
                                                 
15 This is tested with a usual T-Test on identical averages.     14
Table 2: Percentage of persons with severance payments in subgroups 
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1 - 5 employees 
6 - 19 employees 
20 - 199 employees 




































































Table 3: Severance payments in different industries 
  Share of employees 










Fraction of persons 





Farming, Forestry, Fishery  0.013  0.032  0.150 
Manufacturing 0.232  0.364  0.393 
Construction 0.058  0.208  0.146 
Service industries  0.697  0.397  0.237 
Σ 1  1  0.272 
   15
Another possible, and plausible, determinant that influences the probability of receiving 
severance payments is the general economic situation. Indeed, the correlation between the 
yearly fraction of dismissed persons, who received severance payments, and the growth rate 
of the German GDP is considerably high during the observation period 1991 to 1998 (0.736; 
p=0.010; see Figure 1 for an illustration and Table A in the appendix). The correlation is even 
more obvious for individual dismissals (0.775; p=0.008) than for collective dismissals (0.414; 
p=0.066). Hence, we observe a higher probability of severance payments in years of high 
economic growth. Explanations for this finding are speculative. From an economic point of 
view, firms could be forced by (the anticipation of) court decisions, which may take the firms’ 
economic situation into account, when judges decide on severance payments in dismissal 
protection claims. Hereby, the firms’ economic situation is highly correlated with the general 
economic trend. Ichino et al. (2003) report that local labour market conditions indeed 
influence court decisions at dismissal protection claims in Italy. This explanation cannot be 
separated from possible social motives of firms, whose ability to pay is higher in 
economically good years. 
 























































































Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  16
 
But the results up to this point might change, if we use multivariate tools and control for 
different possible determinants simultaneously. By making use of a binary probit approach we 
examine the determinants of receiving severance payments. The results are listed in Table 4. 
The dichotomous dependent variable has got a one in the case of persons with a severance 
payment and a zero otherwise. 
 
The results confirm that firm size increases the probability of severance payments 
considerably. Hence, especially small firms with less than six employees, which are not faced 
by the Protection Against Dismissal Act, do not compensate dismissed persons. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for the existence of works councils in the firms of 
the dismissed employees. Partly, the firm size effect might rather be a works council’s effect, 
since larger firms are more probable to have a works council and works councils act towards 
severance payments in negotiations with the management.  
 
Additionally, the probability of severance payments increases with tenure and is significantly 
higher for women. The positive effect of tenure is in line with anticipated (or actual) court 
decisions. The longer the relationship endures the more difficult is a dismissal to be socially 
justifiable. The higher probability of severance payments for women – particularly after 
individual dismissals – can at least partly be explained by the fact that dismissals caused by 
misconduct of the employees are more common among males (0.67 of all dismissals) 
compared to females (0.52, see Falke 1983: 24). It is a reasonable policy for firms to abstain 
from severance payments for persons dismissed because of misconduct in order to keep the 
threatening penalty of detected misconduct or shirking as high as possible. 
 
The results for the industry dummies confirm the descriptive statistics. The probability for 
severance payments is particularly high for employees of the manufacturing sector and very 
low in the farming and construction sector. Possibly, differences between the power of the 
unions of the single industries are responsible for this result. There is information for 
individual union membership in the GSOEP in the years 1993 and 1998. Including a union   17
membership dummy in the regression for the sub sample of these years, no effect can be 
found. But it may also be the case that powerful unions cause higher severance probabilities 
in these industries for both members and non-members. The evidence is at least in line with 
this consideration. The net union density
16, defined as employed union members divided by 
all employees, is particularly high in the industries with a high fraction of severance 
payments. For example, the union density of the early 1990s amounts to 0.39 in chemistry, 
0.43 in mining and even more in some other sub-sectors of manufacturing compared to only 
0.17 in the construction sector (see Fitzenberger et al. 1999: 258f). 
 
In regression (2) we take the consideration into account that the probability to receive a 
severance payment might not be independent from the expected amount of the payment. If a 
dismissed employee only expects to receive a marginal payment, he will probably not exert 
much effort to get it. Therefore, we include the expected estimated severance payment as an 
additional variable in the regression (see also regression 1 of Table 6 in the subsequent 
subsection). Indeed, the estimated amount of the payment is highly correlated with the 
probability to receive a payment. The results with respect to the other variables are not 
affected by this modified specification, though. 
 
In spite of the very different legal situation for individual and collective dismissals, there are 
no significant differences with respect to the probability of payments (regression 3). However, 
we can observe considerable differences between the influencing factors of severance 
payments with individual and collective dismissals respectively (regression 4 and 5). For 
individually dismissed persons there are higher probabilities of severance payments for 
German citizens as compared to foreigners, for West German persons as compared to East 
Germans and for employees with many years of schooling. Possibly, employers anticipate that 
the probability of dismissal protection claims is lower for foreigners and less educated 
employees, what could make it rational from their point of view to pay severance payments 
                                                 
16 Sometimes a gross union density, defined as all union members over all employees is mentioned as well. Since 
there are several non-employed union members like students, unemployed and retired persons, this measure 
overestimates the influence of the unions especially for shrinking industries like mining. Here, the gross union 
density amounts to 0.7.   18
for German rather than for foreign employees. The same explanation may hold for differences 
between West- and East Germany as well. Since employees (and employers) were not 
perfectly informed about dismissal protection of employees in the first years after the German 
re-unification in 1990, risks of dismissal protection claims might have been much lower for 
East German firms. 
 
Age, marital status, children in the household and unemployment spells subsequent to the 
dismissal do not affect the severance pay probability significantly. Hence, neither the future 
job nor individual social criteria are important determinants of receiving severance pay. 
Apparently the employers do not care very much about the individual situations and future 
career opportunities of the dismissed employees. There hardly seems to be any relevance of a 
welfare function of severance payments as mentioned in the introduction above. The results 
for the year dummies are not listed. In principal the descriptive results are confirmed. The 
probability of severance payments differs across years cyclically. 
 
So far we have pointed out the important determinants for the receipt of severance payments. 
The probability of severance payments depends on both individual characteristics, like in 
particular tenure but also sex and citizenship, and firm characteristics, like firm size and 
industry. But nothing is said about the size of severance payments until now. The amount of 
the payments might differ between different groups of employees as well, which would have 
important monetary consequences for the affected employees as well as for the economic 
situations of the firms. Thus, in the next section we analyse the subgroup of dismissed persons 
with severance payments in more detail. We want to examine the determinants of the size of 
severance payments. It seems interesting whether high probabilities of severance payments 
come along with high sizes or, in contrary, whether probability and size act as substitutes. 
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Table 4: Binary probit regressions on received severance payments 
  Whole sample 
 























































































Firm size (base: 20-199): 
1 - 5 employees 
 
6 - 19 employees 
 



















































































































$   ___ 0.308*** 
(4.67) 
____ ___  ___ 










Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 2534  2534  2221  1452  769 
Log-Likelihood -1180.46  -1169.75  -1049.09  -631.21  -399.31 
Pseudo  R²  0.204  0.211 0.209  0.243 0.180 
Notes:  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 level. 
$ : Estimated amount of severance pay in accordance with model 1 of Table 6 (= 6.519 + 
0.0558 • Tenure + 0.00063 • Monthly Gross Wage.   20
 
3.3 By which characteristics is the size of severance payments determined? 
 
As already mentioned above, there are some obvious determinants for the size of severance 
payments. Very often tenure and the wage are used to determine severance payments. But 
other characteristics might be important as well. For example higher severance payments for 
persons with children in the household or faced by unemployment may hint to a relevance of 
a welfare function of employers with social motives. Higher payments from big companies 
may occur due to higher ability to pay.  
 
Table 5 indicates that the size of severance payments is higher for men, persons with no child 
in the household and other marital status than single, white collars, persons employed in big 
firms, and in West Germany. But we can observe higher former wages and partly higher 
tenure for these groups, too. Therefore, it is useful to calculate so called severance pay factors 
(see Hemmer 1997a: 146), which are defined by:
  
  years) (in    Tenure     €) (in    ge monthly wa   Gross
€) (in  payment    Severance




The wages and severance payments of all years are deflated with the German consumer price 
index with the base of the year 2002. A severance pay factor of 0.5 means a severance 
payment of half a monthly wage per year of tenure. Model (1) of Table 6 shows that tenure 
and the previous wage are indeed very important factors to determine the amount of severance 
payments. Looking at the mean severance pay factors of the variables, we find a different 
picture compared to the basic size of severance payments. Indeed, there are higher severance 
pay factors for white collars and in West Germany. These results can be explained with the 
worse economic situation of East-German firms and with a better relationship of white 
collared employees to the management respectively. There are no considerable differences for 
the other variables.  
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Table 5: Average amount of severance pay in subgroups  
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1 - 5 employees 
6 - 19 employees 
20 - 199 employees 


















































































































































Note: Severance pay factor = amount of severance pay / (gross monthly wage * tenure).    22
 
Whereas the average amount of severance pay is higher for persons faced by collective 
dismissals (€ 10,400) compared with individual dismissals (€ 8,600), things change as to the 
average severance pay factor, which is higher for individual dismissals (0.5 versus 0.45). 
 
Next to the comparison of the averages, the analysis of the distribution of severance payments 
is useful. We can observe a huge variance as to the amount of severance payments as well as 
to the severance pay factor (see Figure 2 and 3 as well as Table B and Figure A and B in the 
appendix). Nearly a quarter of severance payments do not exceed 2,000 €. However, more 
than 10 percent of severance payments in the sample come at least to € 20,000. This huge 
span is not only caused by individual differences in the previous wage and/or tenure.  
 
The distribution of the severance pay factors reveals considerable inequality as well. 10 
percent of the dismissed persons receive a factor of at least 0.92, whereas the bottom 10% of 
the distribution has to be content with a factor of at most 0.11. The inequality of severance 
pay factors is even higher for the subgroup of collectively dismissed employees. The 
corresponding values for the 10
th and the 90
th percentile are 0.09 and 0.96 respectively. 
 
 





























































































Note:   F(·) = Distribution function of severance payments (figure 2) respectively severance pay 
  factors (figure 3).  
 
 
Despite the observed huge variance in the data, there are some significant determinants of the 
amount of severance pay, what is shown by the regressions. Model (1) of Table 6 points out 
the particular relevance of tenure and the previous wage. The full set of variables like in 
subsection 3.2 is used in addition to the gross monthly wage in the previous job within a 
simple OLS approach to explain the log of the amount of severance payments in model (2) of 
Table 6. Making use of the same variables again, a comparison to the results of subsection 3.2 
is possible. It turns out that tenure, wage in the previous job, age, region and firm size are the 
significant factors within this specification. The other variables, as well as the year and 
industry dummies, have no significant effect. Although the coefficient children under age in 
the household has a positive sign, a significant “social bonus” cannot be confirmed in general. 
The coefficient for an unemployment spell subsequent to the dismissal is even negative. 
Hence, we cannot find clear empirical evidence for a welfare function of severance payments. 
The most important determinant for severance payments is the wage in the previous job. The 
average previous wage in the sample is € 1,987. Hence, the coefficient of 0.0006 means that 
on average a doubling of the wage doubles the severance payment as well.  
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Additionally, the amount of severance payments increases with the size of the firm. The 
received payments of employees from big firms with more than 2000 employees are 50 
percent higher than in medium sized firms with 20 to 200 employees. This is particularly true 
for individual dismissals. The result for region differs considerably between the estimations 
for individual and collective dismissals as well (see models (4) and (5)). Significant 
differences between West- and East Germany cannot be observed in the case of individual 
dismissals. However, severance payments in the context of collective dismissals are 50 
percent higher in West Germany as compared to East Germany. Subsequent to the German re-
unification many East-German firms were bankrupt and did not have the financial 
opportunities to afford higher severance payments even if they would have wanted to.  
 
Probably, the workers receiving severance payments are not a random selection of all 
dismissed workers. In order to take into account a possible selection bias a Heckman selection 
model (see Heckman 1976) is used, where the amount of severance payments and the 
probability to get a payment are estimated in one common approach. The results of the Probit 
(Selection) model coincide with the outcomes of the binary probit model in the previous 
subsection. It turns out that indeed a sample selection occurs. Nevertheless tenure and the 
previous wage are confirmed as the most important determinants, and the results for age 
remains significant as well. However, the results for firm size change and the coefficient for 
citizenship becomes significantly negative. Hence, taking the selection into account, the 
amount of severance payments is smaller for foreign dismissed employees. 
 
Recapitulating, the average severance payment in the German sample amounts to € 9,200 in 
prizes of the year 2002. However, a huge variance can be observed, which can still be found, 
when we look at severance pay factors defined as the individual severance payment divided 
by the previous gross monthly wage and tenure. In fact, the previous wage and tenure are the 
most important determinants of the size of severance payments. But age and citizenship are 
relevant factors as well. In order to discuss the effects of severance payments for the 
individuals, the reemployment rates have already been mentioned. If an employee, who 
received a severance payment, finds a job immediately after her dismissal and possibly even 
increases her wage, she is better off compared to a further employment in her previous firm. 
This leads directly to the question of the relevance of overcompensation.   25
Table 6: Determinants of the amount of severance payments (Dependent variable: Ln(severance payment)) 
  Whole Sample  Individual 
Dismissals 
Collective 
Dismissals  Heckman Selection Model 
  (1)   OLS  (2)   OLS  (3)   OLS  (4)   OLS  (5)   OLS  Ln(severance pay)  Prob(severance pay) 
Sex (male)    -0.090         (1.22) -0.094         (1.21) -0.054         (0.61) -0.118         (0.76)    0.073           (0.85)    -0.186***         (2.75) 
Age     0.012***   (2.82)  0.013***   (2.84)   0.019***    (3.36)  0.004          (0.47)    0.013***      (2.64)    0.002               (0.45) 
Years of Schooling     0.005         (0.30) -0.010         (0.53) -0.023         (1.11)  0.005          (0.13)   -0.023           (1.18)     0.035**            (2.24) 
Marital status (single)    -0.163         (1.50) -0.109         (0.94)  0.045         (0.33)  -0.363         (1.61)    0.026           (0.21)    -0.223**           (2.37) 
Child in household     0.079         (1.04)  0.104         (1.30)   0.188*       (1.93)   0.062          (0.44)    0.052           (0.60)     0.016                (0.23) 
Unemployed     -0.025         (0.40) -0.016         (0.24)  0.002         (0.02)   0.018          (0.14)   -0.075           (1.02)     0.065                (1.09) 
Blue collar worker    -0.066         (0.80) -0.088         (1.01) -0.097         (0.95) -0.121         (0.74)   -0.031           (0.32)    -0.066               (0.85) 
Tenure   0.0558***   (17.4)   0.046***   (11.5)  0.047***   (10.9)   0.045***   (8.93)   0.050***    (5.91)    0.024***     (4.74)     0.042***          (10.9) 
Monthly Gross Wage   0.0006***   (19.6)   0.0005*** (11.4)  0.0005*** (10.7)   0.0005*** (9.36)   0.0005***  (4.97)    0.0006***   (12.5) ---- 
Firm size (base: 20-199):
1 - 5 employees 
6 - 19 employees 




-0.509**     (2.43)
-0.158         (1.51)
 0.200***   (2.61) 
 0.471***   (5.08)
 
-0.473**     (2.08)
-0.106         (0.93)
 0.226***    (2.78)
 0.470***    (4.81)
 
-0.256         (0.77)
-0.010         (0.74)
 0.230**      (2.40)
 0.599***    (5.15)
 
-0.629*       (1.81) 
-0.138         (0.62) 
 0.219         (1.47) 
 0.282         (1.59) 
 
   0.258            (1.12)
   0.126            (1.10)
  -0.035            (0.38)
   0.207*          (1.83)
 
  -1.010***         (7.12) 
  -0.353***         (4.27) 
---- 
   0.261***         (3.36) 






 0.109         (0.45) 
 0.069         (0.91) 
-0.045         (0.40)
 
 0.097          (0.39)
 0.046         (0.58) 
-0.037         (0.30)
 
-0.077         (0.22) 
 0.070         (0.74) 
 0.052         (0.38) 
 
 0.212          (0.55)
 0.031          (0.21)
-0.130         (0.51)
 
   0.506*          (1.90)
  -0.099            (1.13)
   0.027            (0.22)
 
  -0.623***         (3.12) 
   0.233***         (3.28) 
  -0.142               (1.50) 
Region (West Germany)     0.161*       (1.78)  0.153         (1.57)  -0.011         (0.10)  0.436**      (2.18)    0.034            (0.35)    0.075               (1.06) 
Citizenship (German)    -0.126         (1.23) -0.131         (1.21) -0.192         (1.51)  0.037         (0.18)    -0.295**        (2.51)    0.151               (1.61) 
Collective dismissal    ----  0.025         (0.36)  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
Intercept   6.519***     (79.2)   6.339***   (19.1)  6.328***   (18.0)   6.313***   (15.0)   6.385***   (9.88)     8.184***      (20.0)   -1.514***         (4.93) 
Year dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 689  689 632 379 253  689  2534 
 R²adj. = 0.494  R²adj. = 0.543  R²adj. = 0.534  R²adj. = 0.580  R²adj. = 0.456 
ρ = -0.888*** (29.50) 
λ = -0.998*** (11.79) 
Notes:  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level.  
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3.4 Is overcompensation to be considered a relevant issue? 
 
In order to answer this question it is first of all necessary to define and create a measure for 
overcompensation. One can speak of an overcompensated dismissed employee, if the present 
value of future wages in addition to the severance payment exceeds the hypothetical present 
value of the wage profile in the dismissing firm (see e.g. Fabel 1996). This definition cannot 
be used with the data of the GSOEP. Therefore, we will speak of overcompensation, if a 
person received a severance payment and has a higher wage in her new job after the 
dismissal. Certainly, this simple measure is imperfect, because on the one hand 
overcompensation may also occur in cases with high severance payments and minor wage 
reductions or moderate durations of unemployment.
17 On the other hand, wage increases may 
be transitory. But because of the relevance of increasing wage profiles the latter argument 
does probably not fit for many cases. Hence, the applied proxy for overcompensation might 
be interpreted as a lower bound for actual overcompensation. 
 
Indeed, a substantial fraction can be assigned to the category of overcompensated employees 
even with this definition. More than one fourth of dismissed persons with severance payments 
are reemployed and experience a nominal wage increase (see Table 7). This fraction drops by 
4 points focussing on real wage increases. Based on the fraction of reemployed persons, even 
more than half get a higher wage in addition to the severance payment. Persons with 
severance payments are not worse off in their subsequent careers compared to dismissed 
employees without severance payments. Hence, once again a particular relevance of a welfare 
function of severance payments cannot be confirmed.  
 
The reemployment rate is much higher in cases of collective dismissals. While more than 50 
percent of the affected persons are reemployed in the next year, only slightly more than one 
third of individually dismissed employees have a new job. However, the distribution of wage 
                                                 
17 Unemployed persons receive unemployment benefits amounting to 60 percent of their net monthly wage of the 
last year, if they have been employed subject to social insurance contribution at least 12 months within the last 
three years. This fraction increases to 0.67 if the person has at least one child. The duration of the claim – 
depending on the duration of previous employment and the age – was between 6 and 32 months during the 
observation period. Additionally, a reduced tax rate for severance payments can enlarge the relevance of 
overcompensation.    27
increases within the subgroup of reemployed persons with or without severance payments is 
very similar between individual and collective dismissals.  
 
Table 7: Consequences of dismissals – reemployment rates and wage increases 






Number of observations (n)  2534  1452  769 
Reemployed persons (share of n)  0.429  0.361  0.580 
Persons with nominal wage increases (share of n) 0.261  0.213  0.374 
Persons with real wage increases (share of n)  0.221  0.178  0.320 
      
Persons with severance payments (sp)  689  379  253 
Reemployed persons (share of sp)  0.419  0.359  0.526 
Persons with real wage increases (share of sp)  0.270  0.223  0.338 
Persons with wage increases (share of sp)  0.232  0.170  0.314 
 
Overcompensated employees can be characterized by comparing the descriptive statistics of 
Table C (see Appendix) with those of not overcompensated employees. Apparently, 
overcompensated workers tend to be well educated white-collar workers, German citizens 
from East-Germany with no unemployment spell subsequent to their dismissal. To sum up, 
we can state that overcompensation is indeed a relevant phenomenon. Although in many cases 
severance payments are required to finance times of non-employment, a lot of persons are 
better off with their severance pay in addition to higher wages. 
 
Finally, some hints due to shortcomings of the data have to be given. First, a legally required 
period of notice is usually part of the employment contract after a common six-month 
probation period. This period of notice starts with one month and is increasing with tenure up 
to seven months for employees with tenure of more than 20 years. Sometimes dismissed 
employees do not have to work the whole remaining time, but do get their wage until the 
expiration of the contract. Hence, this continued pay after dismissals without duty to work 
corresponds to severance payments. This effect cannot be captured with the data. 
Additionally, not every court decision may have been made by the time of the survey of the 
GSOEP. Although 80 percent of dismissal protection claims are finished within six months 
and almost all after twelve months (see Franke 1996: 100), some dismissal protection claims   28
were probably not concluded at the date of the particular survey.
18 In sum, slightly more than 
27 percent of dismissed employees may benefit from severance payments and the size of the 
payments may be slightly underestimated as well. For a more detailed analysis it would be 
helpful to have additional information on the reason of each dismissal and on whether the 
employees took legal action.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this empirical study we analysed severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany 
in the 1990s. In particular we responded to the questions: 1.) “Who gets severance 
payments?“ 2.) “How much do recipients get?“ and 3.) “Is overcompensation relevant?“ It 
turned out that approximately one third of dismissed employees receive a severance payment 
from their former employers. Tenure and firm size are the most important determinants with 
respect to the receipt of a severance bonus. Additionally there are industry and business cycle 
effects, though. The size of severance payments is slightly higher for collectively (€ 10,400) 
than individually dismissed persons (€ 8,600). The most important determinants for the size 
are tenure and the previous wage. However, age and citizenship do matter as well. About one 
quarter of dismissed employees are better off in the future in the sense that they receive higher 
wages in addition to a severance bonus. Although law in Germany lays down a welfare 
function of severance payments, there is hardly any evidence for adequate empirical 
relevance. 
 
The huge variances in the results are worth mentioning. Hence, there is enormous uncertainty 
for both, employees and employers about the bonuses or respectively the costs of dismissals 
at least since severance payments are not fixed in an ex ante bargaining. Due to the 
unspecified legal situation it seems to be beneficial for employees to insist on severance 
payments and threaten with a suit in order to increase the chance of a substantial severance 
                                                 
18 Note that the survey is conducted at the mid of each year and the individuals provide information about the 
whole last calendar year.   29
payment.
19 Taking this behaviour into account, employers might be better off by fixing a 
(generous) amount of severance payment as an explicit part of the employment contract. This 
might even reduce total wage costs, because risk premiums of risk averse employees can be 
economised.  
 
Focussing on collective dismissals it is stated by Hemmer (1997c: 130) that two of three firms 
wish the legal framework of social plans to be improved. Apart from that, Hemmer (1997b: 
102) points out that firms more and more often make use of alternative procedures of the 
adaptation of staffing levels instead of dismissals, such as early retirement plans, training 
programs, assistance to become self-employed, outplacement and so on.  
 
There is much discussion about modifications of the German severance pay system. Some 
authors propose a more explicit orientation of the size of severance payments on the economic 
situation of the dismissed employees, which is in line with the German Work Constitution Act 
(§112). In detail, Hemmer (1997c: 132f) suggests that the severance payment should increase 
with future employment status. This might be an improvement in terms of equity, but neglects 
harmful incentives for omitted job search. 
 
An increasing number of politicians as well as researchers discuss the possibility of 
introducing mandatory severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany for 
macroeconomic reasons as well (see e.g. IZA 2002, Jahn 2002, Handelsblatt 2003). It is often 
argued that the uncertain legal situation leads to a reduction of recruitments. Concrete 
suggestions include an annulment of dismissal protection within the first years of tenure in 
favour of a mandatory severance pay of e.g. one monthly wage per year of tenure. Intuitively, 
such a kind of modification of the legal situation concerning severance payments seems to be 
reasonable. However, Malo and Perez (2003) recently address the problem of moving from an 
unknown severance pay situation to a known severance pay one theoretically and find 
ambiguous effects on severance pay and expecting firing costs. The examination of this issue 
is an exciting task for further both empirical and theoretical research. 
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Table A: Fraction of dismissed persons with severance payments and ∆GDP in the 1990s 
(corresponds to Figure 1) 
Year  Fraction of dismissed persons, who 
received severance payments  ∆GDP 
1991 0,343  ---* 
1992 0,386 0,074 
1993 0,351 0,025 
1994 0,433 0,049 
1995 0,341 0,038 
1996 0,239 0,018 
1997 0,215 0,021 
1998 0,255 0,031 
1999 0,206 0,026 
2000 0,145 0,026 
2001 0,136 0,02 
2002 0,177 0,018 




Table B: Distribution of severance payments and severance pay factors 
  (corresponds to Figure 2, 3, A and B) 
  Amount of severance payment  Severance pay factor 












0.1  1,089 1,105 1,077 0.108 0.119  0.087 
0.2  1,764 1,764 1,842 0.165 0.183  0.133 
0.3  2,582 2,396 2,774 0.219 0.242  0.176 
0.4  3,348 3,218 3,859 0.276 0.302  0.252 
0.5  4,663 4,356 5,155 0.347 0.375  0.292 
0.6  6,140 5,881 6,755 0.428 0.449  0.396 
0.7  8,446 7,982 9,247 0.534 0.543  0.534 
0.8  12,947 11,762 14,860  0.667  0.688  0.642 
0.9  22,190 19,365 27,854  0.917  0.917  0.955 
Note: Severance pay factor = amount of severance pay / (gross monthly wage * tenure)  
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Note:   F(·) = Distribution function of severance payments (figure A) respectively severance pay 



























































































Collective dismissals  34
Table C: Descriptive statistics and overcompensation  




















Severance Payment  0.272  0  1  1 
Sex (male)  0.673  0.694  0.617  0.667 
Age (years)  39.48  38.46  42.19  39.12 
Years of schooling  11.41  11.35  11.57  12.25 
Marital status (single)  0.258  0.297  0.155  0.183 
Child in household  0.422  0.425  0.415  0.505 
Unemployed   0.521  0.530  0.496  0.231 
Blue collar worker  0.616  0.638  0.557  0.473 
Tenure (years)  7.303  5.488  12.16  10.25 
Firm size: 
1 - 5 employees 
6 - 19 employees 
20 - 199 employees 



















































Region (West Germany)  0.519  0.523  0.507  0.419 
Citizenship (German)  0.836  0.838  0.830  0.930 
 
 